ABSTRACT
Introduction
One of the topics of the international cooperation project CAPES-COFECUB entitled "Bare Nouns in Brazilian Portuguese: the syntaxsemantics interface" 1 , coordinated by professor Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin in France and Roberta Pires de Oliveira in Brazil, is the distinction defi nite versus indefi nite and its relation to bare noun phrases. The conference "Weak (In)Defi niteness and Referentiality", held in Florianópolis, SC, Brazil, in August 20 and 21, was a way of achieving a better understanding of the relations between (in)defi niteness, referentiality and the interpretation of noun phrases. The conference was preceded by three mini-courses, all of which were directly linked to the main topic of the conference: Gregory Carlson talked about generics, Claire Beyssade discussed the solutions to weak defi nites, and Pascal Amsili lectured on presuppositions. 2 Most of the papers in this special issue of Revista da ABRALIN were selected from the presentations during the Conference. Carlson et al, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, and Beyssade's papers were written in English for this journal, with the purpose of introducing the main theoretical trends. Since they will be published also in a special issue of Recherches Linguistique de Vincennes, organized by Claire Beyssade and Roberta Pires de Oliveira, in this volume we publish their Portuguese translations.
The theme of the conference, around which all the papers gravitate, is the idea of weak referentiality. Poesio (1994) was the fi rst to identify a class of examples of defi nite descriptions, which he called "weak defi nite", characterized by the absence of uniqueness; lacking, therefore, the hallmark characteristic of the defi nite phrase headed by the defi nite article. Other authors found different types of examples, rising at least two intermingled issues: do weak defi nites differ from "normal" defi nite phrases?; can all the examples of weak defi niteness be unifi ed, or are we dealing with heterogeneous phenomena? There is no consensus about either. In the fi rst section, we introduce the examples that have being labeled "weak defi nite" so far. In the second section, we briefl y summarize some of the most important solutions: the relational view, and the indefi nite defi nite proposal, which groups two distinct approaches the pseudo-incorporation view, which appear in Carlson et al's paper in this volume, and the kind solution, presented in Aguilar & Zwarts' paper also in this volume. We briefl y discuss two approaches the aim of which is a unifi ed theory, one of which is Claire Beyssade's proposal, one of the authors in this dossier. The third section briefl y shows how the papers in this volume are linked to the theme of weak referentiality. In the conclusion, we balance the possibility of a unifi ed theoretical approach.
Weak Defi nites
The content of the defi nite article is one of the greatest themes in semantics. Classically, there are two approaches: the quantifi cational and the presuppositional views represented by Russell (1905) and Frege (1892) respectively, the fathers of modern logic. According to Russell the defi nite article does not denote an individual, but it is a quantifi er. Thus, the nominal phrases in sentences in (1) are of the same semantic type, though they differ with respect to their contents:
(1) a.
The book is on the table. b. A book is on the table.
Without going into the details, in Russell's account, (1.a) states that there is one and just one book that is on the table; whereas in (1.b) the existential quantifi cation asserts that there is at least one book on the table. In Frege's view, only (1.a) carries a presupposition -the presupposition that there is one and just one book -, and the nominal phrase is of type <e>, i.e. it denotes an individual -that particular book -, whereas in (1.b), the nominal phrase is quantifi cational, and the sentence receives the same treatment as in Russell. Be it one way or another, in both classical approaches, the defi nite article conveys (either semantically or pragmatically) that there is a unique referent that satisfi es the defi nite noun phrase. Both theories need some sort of domain restriction to single out the referent.
An alternative analysis was proposed by Heim in her 1982 dissertation. In Heim's theory the defi nite and the indefi nite noun phrases are semantically equivalent since both introduce free variables. They differ with respect to the role they play in the discourse: indefi nites introduce individuals into the discourse -in her terms, they open a new fi le cardwhereas the defi nite recovers a referent in a fi le card that is already in the common ground, i.e. it is familiar. Thus, the defi nite phrase presupposes the referent of the defi nite phrase -i.e. it presupposes that there is a book in example (1.a) -and is an instruction for the hearer to fi nd the fi le that matches the index. The notion of uniqueness is, then, derived by the fact that in order to interpret a defi nite phrase, the hearer must identify one particular fi le card.
3 Poesio (1994) was the fi rst to introduce a series of examples that challenges the view that the defi nite article conveys uniqueness; he labeled this class of examples "Weak Defi nites". Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) introduced another type of examples, which they called "weak defi nite" or "indefi nite defi nite", and other authors came up with other examples, in particular Barker (2005) , and Lyons (1999) . We review some of these examples in the next sections.
The relational weak defi nite
Below are Poesio 1994's examples:
(2) a.
John got the data from the student of a linguist. b. The village is located on the side of a mountain. c.
I usually have breakfast at the corner of an intersection.
Two points should be stressed with respect to the sentences in (2): (i) all the defi nite phrases in (2) have the same structure -the head noun is a relational noun and the complement is an indefi nite phrase -, this is an essential element in Poesio's theoretical account; (ii) there is no way of retrieving a unique referent appealing to some sort of contextual function (domain restriction will not work here). One can felicitously utter (2.b) even if it is not familiar to the speaker and the hearer on which side of the mountain the village is. An intersection normally has four corners, and there is no need for the speaker to know in which corner he has breakfast. Weak defi nites can be used in a situation in which neither the speaker nor the listener has any previous acquaintance with a specifi c intersection or corner, neither is there an implication that the intersection in question has only one corner.
One could imagine that (2.a) is solved by some sort of function which selects the salient individual in the context or from a given set, and uniqueness would then be rescued. Donazzan, in this volume, assumes this solution. Although her paper is mainly devoted to examples similar to those raised by Carlson & Sussman (2005) and , she discusses the case of a teacher who sends one of her pupils to the corner of a classroom, and claims that there is a particular corner which may be contextually recovered. This is certainly the case, but then it is no longer an example of weak defi nite. If the weak defi nite were solved by recovering a particular individual via some function, then the sentence in (2.a) should be synonymous of: (3) John got the data from the student who studies with a linguist.
But (3) is not synonymous of (2.a). The reading Poesio has in mind for (2.a) can be paraphrased as: there is a linguist, and there is a student of that linguist, such that John got the data from that student. Essentially, neither the speaker nor the hearer has to identify a particular individual in order to interpret the sentence. This meaning is just not available for (3). Thus, it seems that weak defi nites, according to Poesio's seminal paper, are not to be related to with any sort of domain restriction.
The class of examples in (2) not only defi es the idea of uniqueness which seems to characterize the defi nite determiner phrase, but also calls into discussion the famous generalization about there-sentences, fi rst mentioned by Milsark (1977) , and which is taken to be a test for defi niteness, as shown in Lee's paper in this volume. Milsark argues that there is a contrast between strong noun phrases and weak ones: only the latter can appear in there-sentences, as shown below:
There is a student in the garden. b. * There is the student in the garden.
Strong determiners presuppose the set denoted by the nounstudent in (4.a) -whereas weak determiners introduce individuals into the discourse. Poesio shows that his examples in (2) do not show the same behavior as the defi nite phrase, since in contrast to (4.b), the example in (5) seems to be natural in there constructions:
(5) There is the student of a linguist in the garden.
Being acceptable in there-constructions may be taken as a diagnostic that the weak defi nite is in fact an indefi nite. However, this does not seem to be the case, since (2.a) does not convey the same information as (6): (6) John got the data from a student of a linguist.
Thus, neither defi nite nor indefi nite, what is this phrase? Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) introduced a different type of weak defi nite or indefi nite defi nite, exemplifi ed below. This class of examples cannot be in there-constructions, as shown in (8): (7) a.
Indefi nite defi nite
Mary went to the store. b. Open the window. c.
I took the train to come here.
(8) *There is the store Mary went.
The main characteristic of the defi nite phrases in (7) is the fact that they do not presuppose uniqueness or familiarity, as can be seen from the ellipsis test. Compare (9.a) and (9.b):
(9) a.
Mary went to the store, and Bill did, too. b. Mary went to the desk, and Bill did, too.
Only (9.a) shows a sloppy reading, according to which Mary has gone to "Stop and Shop" and Bill, to "Target", for example. In (9.b), they both have to go to the same desk. This pair of examples shows another property of this type of weak defi nite: they are lexically restricted. This is not the case with Poesio's relational weak defi nites, where the structure must be fi xed, but not the lexical items. Indefi nite defi nites give rise to "enriched meanings": to go to the store is to go shopping. Moreover, they cannot be modifi ed as shown in (10): (10) Mary went to the new store, and Bill did, too.
In sentence (10), Mary and Bill must have gone to the same store, only a strict reading is possible. Modifi cation is possible, as shown by Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2011) if the modifi er maintains, according to their analysis, a kind denotation -both (11.a) and (11.b) have a weak reading, where John was internee for medical treatment:
John is in the hospital. b. John is in the psychiatric hospital. Carlson et alii (2006) explicitly claim that "in a given event expressed by a weak defi nite, there is not necessarily any unique object picked out." Their main argument concerns example (7.c): the speaker may have taken different trains in her journey, she may have changed trains many times, and this situation can still be truthfully described by (7.c). Thus, there is no need of a unique referent, nor have the interlocutors to be familiar with some referent.
Other types of weak defi nite
Barker (2005) (12) The child held the fi nger of the surgeon. Though Barker proposes that there is just one defi nite article the, he claims that the whole defi nite construction in (12) does not presuppose uniqueness. The sentence in (12) does not imply that the surgeon has just one fi nger, nor is it necessary that there is one fi nger salient in the situation for (12) to be felicitous. Notice that the structure in the examples in (2) has an indefi nite article in the second noun, whereas in (12) the article is defi nite in both occurrences.
Barker stresses Poesio's remark that weak defi nites are very natural in there constructions. If being natural in there construction is a property of weak defi nite, then Lyons (1999) rightly points out the existence of another type of weak defi nite, which he calls "extremely reading" use, exemplifi ed in (13): (13) There is the most intriguing girl in the garden. (Lyons 1999: 247) Zielke's paper in this volume studies the extremely reading case in three languages, Turkish, German and Spanish. Table 1 compares these different types of examples called weak defi nite in literature with respect to their defi ning properties:
Relational indefi nites extremely
The fi rst question that comes to mind is: aren't we dealing with heterogeneous phenomena? Is a unifi ed theory possible? Carlson et alii (2006) explicitly state that their theoretical account covers only the indefi nite defi nite; Poesio (2004) and Barker (2005) claim that their approaches are explanations only for the relational or possessive defi nite. However, some authors have claimed that a unifi ed theory is possible, among them Beyssade (in this volume), and Corblin (in press). In the fi rst section, we briefl y review Poesio's and Barker's solutions to the relational defi nite. The second section contrasts Carlson et alii (2006) and Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts' (2011) approaches to the indefi nite defi nite. Finally, in the last section, sketches of unifi ed theories are presented. The aim is not to present a full account of each proposal, but to enumerate them and to evaluate the possibility of a unifi ed treatment for the weak defi nites.
Solutions

Relational nouns
Though Barker (2005) extends Poesio's examples of the relational defi nite, which he renames as possessive defi nite, their theoretical explanation for the phenomenon is not exactly the same, even though both reject the ambiguity solution -according to which there are two defi nite determiners the -, and both rely on the fact that of introduces a relation. Thus, their solutions require a possessive structure.
Without going into the details of the implementation, Poesio' solution relies on De Jong (1987) and Zucchi (1993) insight that presuppositional noun phrases are barred from there-constructions. In his approach, presuppositions are rendered as contextual variables or parameters. Thus, the student in (4.b) has a parameter that must be set by the context, and this is the reason why it is blocked from a there sentence. Parameters may be set by the context or they may be anchored; if they are anchored, then they receive a value from some fi le card index, and the contextual variable is replaced by a constant: "an anchored parameter can be replaced by its non-parametric value" (2004: 291) . Anchoring the parameter may only happen when we have a relational noun. When the contextual parameter is anchored, the presupposition of uniqueness (or familiarity) is cancelled.
Here is a sketch of how this solution works. First, of has to be a lexical possessive, i.e. it requires an argument, thus it is relational. This is crucial. In (14), the weak reading is not available because of is not lexically a possessive: (14) ??I don't want to steal the book of a library (294, example 37) Thus, the student in (2.a) is a relational noun and is interpreted as student (x, D), where D is a parameter. In (2.a), this parameter is anchored since it is equated to the variable in the predicate linguist, which is a sortal noun -linguist (y). Replacing D by y, results in student (x, y), which cancels the presupposition and allows the combination with there. This is not the case with (3), because student is not relational in this example and the parameter must be set by the context. Thus, we expect that this defi nite phrase cannot be in there-construction, as it seems to be the case:
(15) *There is the student who studies with a linguist in the garden.
Weak defi nites need relational nouns. Poesio notices that this is also true for cases of bridging or associative defi nites. 5 Barker has a different explanation which relies on two different ways of composing the relational defi nite. He associates the uniqueness presupposition to the fi rst semantic component in the semantic derivation, and proposes two derivations for the defi nite phrase:
the (corner (of-the-intersection)) b. (the · corner) (of-the-intersection) (16.a) derives the strong reading according to which there is one and only one particular corner of the intersection. In (16.b) , the defi nite determiner preserves uniqueness, not of an individual, but of the relation between corners and the intersection. A successful use of a possessive defi nite description, then, is one that provides enough information for the listener to reliably pick out the intended kind of object: it's about the corner of the intersection the speaker is talking about, not the road junction. In other words, "what the speaker has in mind is a unique, specifi c relation, and that specifi city is what the defi nite determiner is marking." (Barker, 2005: 110) .
None of these analysis can describe the indefi nite defi nite.
Indefi nite defi nites: Kinds and Incorporation
Recently, two solutions were proposed for the case of indefi nite defi nites: semantic incorporation and kind denotation, which are classical solutions to bare noun phrases. Carlson (1977) was the fi rst to introduce the idea that bare plurals in English denote the kind, and van Geenhoven's (1998) analysis of Icelandic was seminal in appealing to semantic incorporation as a solution to bare nouns. restricts the idea of incorporation to bare nouns which are not productive in the language. Thus, incorporation cannot be the explanation for bare nouns in Chinese, nor for bare plurals in English. It is probably also not a solution for the bare singular in Brazilian Portuguese either.
6 Let's see these solutions. Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) do not present a thoroughly worked out solution for the indefi nite defi nite, though they sketch such an approach, which is further developed in Carlson et al's paper in this volume. They argue that the indefi nite defi nite shows the same properties of bare singulars in English, as exemplifi ed below:
Semantic Incorporation
(17) John is in prison.
Bare singulars are very restricted in English. Moreover, they are semantically enriched -(17) conveys that John is a prisoner. They are not only lexically restricted, they are also governed by a particular lexical item -John is in hospital is not grammatical and John is in front of the prison is not semantically enriched. Like the indefi nite defi nite, bare singulars cannot be modifi ed -John is in a big prison does not mean that he is a prisoner -, and they do not combine with there-constructions; fi nally, they show sloppy identity in elliptical constructions.
The authors conclude that the indefi nite defi nite should be treated the same way as the bare singular, which amounts to say that the defi nite article in the weak defi nite does not act in the same way as when it is in a defi nite description, though it may have the same semantics. In the paper in this volume, Carlson et alii clarify the role of the defi nite determiner, and the semantic structure of the weak defi nite.
'Weak' defi nites should in fact not be subsumed under a more general semantic treatment, but form a distinguished class of (apparent) defi nite descriptions on their own that shares a semantics with (at least) bare count singulars, and probably not with defi nites. (Carlson et alii, 2006: 179) Thus, weak defi nites behave like bare singulars, and the same semantic account should be given for both constructions. The literature on bare singulars, in languages where the bare singular is lexically restricted (Spanish and Romanian, for instance)
7
, claims that they are semantically incorporated. "Weak defi nite NPs function exactly like bare singulars. They show all the earmarks of semantic incorporation." (Carlson, 2006: 8) Semantic incorporation was designed to account for cases where the noun phrase is restricted, lacks some of its usual features (has no overt determiner, or no case morphology, for instance), and gives rise to an "enriched meaning".
8 Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & Alexandropoulou in their paper on Greek bare nouns discuss semantic incorporation in more detail. Roughly speaking, a semantically incorporated noun denotes a property which is combined with the property denoted by the verb, engendering a compound predicate. Thus, in (7.a), Maria went to the store, the store is not in fact an argument of the predicate to go to, and it does not refer to an individual, it is rather a predicate that combines with the predicate to go to and generates a different predicate which has a particular meaning: to go to + the store = to go shopping.
But why does English need the defi nite article in the examples in (7)? Why the bare singular is not used in these constructions? What is exactly the role of the defi nite article in incorporation? These are questions that are clarifi ed in the paper in this volume. In principle, this approach cannot explain the cases of possessive defi nites. in detail. They argue that weak defi nite phrases do not denote specifi c objects, but instantiations of specifi c kinds. It is certainly the case that the defi nite determiner has to denote the kind as in the dodo is extinct; the so called defi nite generic. Thus, in their approach, uniqueness is preserved at the kind-level: the defi nite determiner denotes a particular and unique kind. In a nutshell, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts propose that store in (7.a), Mary went to the store, denotes the kind store. Their analysis relies on Dayal's (2004) proposal that in the lexicon nouns are ambiguous between denoting a set of individuals (=object level) and kind interpretations. Thus, the lexicon is sorted out into individuals and kinds. Moreover, they propose a "usage" predicate U that denotes the set of all the stereotypical events associated with a particular noun. U (e, store k ) gives us the stereotypical events related to the kind store, i.e. the enriched meaning of going shop. The U predicate explains why the weak reading only happens with some nouns: not all nouns have stereotypical usages. The kind noun store k is then instantiated into the individual (object level) stores, but since the instantiations are not existentially closed, they can explain the lack of uniqueness for the instantiations. Thus, (7.a) is paraphrased as: There is an event whose agent is Mary and this is an event that involves the kind store as theme and the stereotypical events in which the kind store is involved, and this kind has instantiations. As a result, uniqueness is just for the kind.
Kind reference
But now we have lost the relation with the bare singulars in English, unless we also want to say that the bare singular denotes the kind. Moreover, it is unclear how this analysis could be applied to the relational weak defi nites. Finally, this approach predicts that the defi nite generics and the weak defi nites have the same behavior.
Unifi ed treatments?
In the previous analyses, the authors make clear that their aim is not a unifi ed account of both the relational defi nite and the indefi nite defi nite. Though both types of examples are called weak defi nite, perhaps because they share the property of lacking the presupposition of uniqueness, they may constitute different phenomena.
There are at least two proposals for a unifi ed solution, both relying on weak familiarity 9 and aiming at a unifi ed semantics for the defi nite article: Beyssade (in this volume) proposes that the nouns in the weak reading denote types (intensional entities), her account explores the idea of enriching the ontology, as already found in Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts; Corblin (in press) understands that all examples of weak defi nite are cases of relational defi nites, thus extending the relational solution to all cases. He understands that all weak defi nites are relational nouns, which are turned into a function the denotation of which is a single individual. However, as already mentioned, it is unclear that the relational defi nites refer to a single individual. Both Poesio and Barker argue that this is not the case. Moreover, Roberts (2003) explicitly claims that her approach cannot deal with relational weak defi nites precisely because they do not refer uniquely. As explicitly discussed in several papers by Carlson and by Carlson et alii (in this volume) , indefi nite defi nites do not refer uniquely, as the train example shows. Moreover, it is unclear that nouns such as train are relational. If train is a relational noun, then, we expect car to be relational too, and if it is, then we expect it to have a weak reading, but (18) has no such reading:
(18) John came with the car.
The idea of a different entity to which the weak defi nite refers seems to be more promising, but it also faces several challenges, as we will see in the next section, when we discuss Beyssade's proposal.
None of these explanations can account for the example of extraordinary reading in (13), which may be an indication that this is a different phenomenon.
The papers in this issue
The papers presented during the conference dealt with topics directly raised by weak defi niteness: the three papers given in Portuguese translation in this issue are theoretical approaches to weak defi nites. Carlson et al's paper, "Defi nidos fracos, uma forma de defi nitude: investigações empíricas", discusses the results of different experiments. It shows that the normal defi nite description and the weak defi nite behave differently since only the weak defi nite denotes non-uniquely; moreover speakers interpret the weak defi nite as semantically enriched, and fi nally speakers interpret differently a weak defi nite and a weak indefi nite -an indefi nite phrase with a noun that raises weak readings when combined with a defi nite article. Thus, the defi nite article in a weak defi nite is not an expletive. Though the paper is mostly about the results of the experiments, which indeed call for an explanation, it also develops the authors' theoretical explanation. Their main claim is that the issue is not so much about choosing between incorporation or kind analysis -suggesting that the noun in the weak defi nite may be kind denoting -, but about the role of the defi nite article. Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts adopt the traditional view on the defi nite article, it presupposes familiarity and uniqueness, i.e. it denotes a particular individual. Carlson and his collaborators claim that the semantic composition of the weak defi nite is not the same as that of the normal defi nite, which applies to the noun directly and returns the only individual who has that property. In the weak defi nite, the semantic structure is as below:
The defi nite article combines with a VP, and it conveys the understanding that the situation denoted by the VP is familiar, in accordance with the results of the last experiment. No doubt there is a lot to be developed.
In "Defi nidos fracos denotam a espécie", Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts discuss in detail their approach to weak defi nites. They claim that the weak defi nite and the generic defi nite share the same structure in the sense that in both the noun denotes a kind. Weak defi nites normally appear in the internal position, whereas the defi nite generic seems to be more natural in the external position. There are, however, a number of issues that this proposal raises. Though the authors claim that the noun denotes a kind, they adopt some sort of incorporation to avoid the existential closure of the instantiations of the kind which would allow for anaphora. But, why should there be instantiation of the kind? If there were instantiations of the kind, we would expect the sentence in (20) to have an existential interpretation, paraphrased as "some horses entered in America with the Spanish Colonization. But (20) Would there be the same mechanism to avoid access to the instantiations? How do we explain that there is no semantic enrichment when we have a defi nite generic? Finally, how do they explain the fact that anaphora with the kind is not possible:
(22) John went to the hospital, and Mary did too.
??
It is a place to recover.
Beyssade in "Reabilitando a pressuposição de unicidade" introduces a new class of weak defi nites, as exemplifi ed in (23), and presents her hypothesis that weak defi nites refer to types, not tokens, and that the defi nite article carries a presupposition of existence from which uniqueness is derived:
(23) Jean s'est cassé le bras / la jambe / le doigt.
Jean Refl broke the arm / the leg / the fi nger 'Jean broke his arm / leg / fi nger'
It is interesting to notice that some of her examples of body parts work in Brazilian Portuguese -for instance, lavar o braço (wash the arm), which is not allowed in French. Types are intensional entities, that denote singletons in a taxonomic structure -taxonomic structures, according to the author, are not lattice structures, a point that need clarifi cation -, and the members of which are indistinguishable. Thus, though a type is related to its tokens, which are unique, they are also indistinguishable. According to this approach, when a type denotation is involved the distinction between defi nite and indefi nite is erased in the sense that using one or the other gives the same truth conditions. However, this is a prediction that is not verifi ed by the experiments presented in Carlson et alii (this volume) . Their last experiment shows that speakers interpret differently a weak defi nite and a weak indefi nite. Moreover, it is unclear why only certain nouns can denote the type, since all nouns should have, at least in principle, a type denotation. Thus, it is diffi cult to explain why read the newspaper raises a weak reading, but read the maganize does not, unless that is lexically marked. Moreover, there is no obvious way of deriving the enriched meanings, except by stipulation. Finally, according to her, if 'the NP' denotes more than one N, then the nominal phrase does not denote a token. Thus, by inference it denotes a type. However, there are two cases of presuppositional failure: if there are no individuals, or if there are more than one individual. How are we to differentiate this last case from the type reading?
The other papers in this volume are organized concentrically from the weak defi nite core. Donazzan analyses cases of weak defi nites in Italian and argues for a non-ambiguity semantics for the strong and the weak defi nites, relying on Roberts' notion of weak familiarity. She shows that there is a class of weak defi nites in Italian, but more importantly some of the examples do not engender enriched meanings, though they are characterized by prototypicality, that is, they are lexically restricted:
(24) Esco a bere il caffè al bar. (example (14)) I-go out to drink the coffee at-the bar 'I'm going out to have a coffee at the bar.'
Though (24) is prototypical because the weak reading only happens with caffè (coffee), it shows no semantic enrichment. Thus, semantic enrichment is not a necessary feature of weak defi nites. Donazzan explores Roberts' idea of weak familiarity to claim that in all cases uniqueness is preserved. As we have already mentioned, that may not be the case; weak defi nites do not seem to refer uniquely, as Roberts herself makes clear in her paper with respect to the relational defi nites; but even if we restrict the analysis to the indefi nite defi nite it is not clear that uniqueness is preserved (at least at the object level).
Basso & Vogt look at the issue of weak defi niteness from a very original point of view: demonstratives. The authors wonder whether there are weak demonstratives; i.e. demonstratives which lack uniqueness, in the sense that they may be truthfully used in a situation to denote more than one individual. They come up with examples such as:
(25) John went to this doctor, and Mary did too. (pointing to one specialty in a list of medical specialties)
They show that the weak demonstrative passes the sloppy reading test, since John and Mary may have gone to different doctors of the same specialty. They also carry enriched meanings: John and Mary want medical treatments. Besides being a clear presentation of AguilarGuevara & Zwarts kind proposal, their paper turns out to be an argument in favor of this analysis, since they show that the only possibility for (25) is to interpret the demonstrative as a sub-kind (a specialty). The fact that the demonstrative cannot refer to the maximal entity is one of its characteristic; the relevant point is that this non maximal entity has to be a sub-kind. It is unclear whether we need the kind theory to explain this data, although it certainly shows that the N in a weak construction seems to denote a kind. Carlson & Sussman (2005) , Carlson et alii (2006) , and Carlson et alii (in this volume) anchor their theoretical claims about the weak defi nites on psycholinguistic experiments. Zielke investigates the behavior of second language learners of European Spanish, by speakers of Turkish and German, with respect to the so called "extremely reading", which was introduced in the literature by Lyons (1999) . In (26), we have an example of the extremely reading in Spanish:
(26) En esta librería hay los mejores libros. in this book store there-are the best books. 'In this book store there are the best books.'
The interest of the paper lies on the fact Turkish has no defi nite determiner, thus there is no formal distinction between the defi nite and the indefi nite versions of the there-construction. The hypothesis was, then, that Turkish learners would have more diffi culties interpreting the Spanish extremely reading examples then German learners. This hypothesis was not confi rmed. In fact, both German and Turkish speakers had diffi culties with the extremely reading. It is unclear whether the extremely reading belongs to the class of weak defi nites. As shown on table 1 above, the extremely reading presupposes uniqueness, though not familiarity. Thus, we need a better understanding of this phenomenon.
Semantic incorporation is commonly invoked as the explanation for bare nouns, in particular their role in languages where their use is restricted. One of the main features of semantic incorporation is number neutrality, which, in Carlson's model explains the lack of uniqueness of the weak defi nite. Relying on an extensive and original investigation of both oral and written corpora in Greek, Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & Alexandropoulou investigate bare singulars in this language to conclude, going against the strict view on incorporation, that they are not number neutral, but singular (in accordance with Dayal's recent (2011) analysis of Hindi), and that they are arguments -classically, incorporated nominal phrases are considered referentially weak. Here is an example from their corpora that supports their claim against number neutrality:
(27) Ehi ghamo sto dhiplano horio. #Enan has wedding in.the next village one stin eklisia ke enan sto dhimarhio. in.the church and one in.the town.hall 'There is a wedding in the next village. One is in the church and one in the town hall.'
If ghamo (wedding) were number neutral, the sequence should be acceptable, but it is not. Relying on the empirical support of their corpus analysis, their paper challenges the strict view of incorporation, a major theoretical contribution. The challenge is to explain how bare singulars can be at the same time arguments and semantically incorporated.
Lee's paper investigates the distinction between defi nite and indefi nite noun phrases, looking at numeral noun phrases in Korean. Korean is a classifi er language and the numeral may occupy two different positions: the noun may precede a numeral classifi er consisting of a numeral expression and a classifi er as in (28. Traditionally these different number constructions were associated with defi nite and indefi nite readings, respectively. The author shows that this is not the case, though both appear in there-construction. The post numeral classifi er construction, where the numeral appears after the noun, may receive defi nite and indefi nite interpretations; whereas the pre numeral classifi er construction is defi nite.
The last paper is Foltran & Rodrigues' discussion about the syntaxsemantic of copular clauses in Brazilian Portuguese in which the predicate exhibits the unmarked form for gender and number, in spite of the feminine and feminine plural forms of subjects:
(29) a.
Maria bêbada é chato. Maria drunk-fem is boring-Neutral b. Crianças é divertido.
Children is funny-Neutral
The authors argue that in (29) we have two different structures: (29.a) is a small clause, the subject of which is a situation, which asks for a neutral agreement; whereas in (29.b) the subject is a DP which lacks the agreement features. They contribute to the discussion because structures like (29.b) must be indefi nite.
Conclusion
The notion of weak defi nites is not self evident as the examples discussed in the papers during the conference clearly testify. One of the goals of the conference was precisely to clarify this notion, as a fi rst step towards evaluating the best theoretical description. The topic of weak defi nites, and its relation to weak referentiality, is a fairly recent one and that is why some of the basic questions are still open, the most important of them being the possibility of unifying theoretically all the structures and examples discussed in the papers of this volume.
The only feature that apparently unifi es all the examples that constitute the so-called "weak defi nites" is, from a descriptive point of view, the lack of the presupposition of uniqueness in the use of a defi nite description, except from the "extremely reading", which lacks familiarity. But notice that some proposals -Corblin (in press) and Donazzan (this volume) -rescue the idea of uniqueness. So, what exactly characterizes the weak defi nite? Probably, the answer to this question leads to a unifi ed or a non-unifi ed theory of weak defi nites, and we hope that the papers here collected illuminate the search for such answers.
